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ESA GIVES A "HOOT" ABOUT THE OWL:
FOREST CONSERVATION COUNCIL v.
ROSBORO LUMBER CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Man's negative impact on the environment is one of the most
controversial issues facing the United States today. The rising rate
of species extinction, combined with pressing environmental con-
cerns, has clashed with strong economic and social interests to pro-
duce a major topic of debate.' Stark warnings about the threat of
wildlife extinction prompted Congressional enactment of legisla-
tion "to remedy the species decline and extinction problem."2 The
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act) was a result of Con-
gress's concern of this issue.3 Despite Congress's efforts to protect
and conserve endangered species, species extinction continues to
progess at an alarming rate.4 In several recent crises, concern for
1. David P. Berschauer, Is the "Endangered Species Act"Endangered?, 21 Sw. U. L.
REv. 991, 991-92 (1992). Berschauer notes that the concern about man's impact
on the environment first became a major topic of public debate in the mid-1960s.
Id. at 991. The debate continues today as various ideals and values surface by dif-
ferent people who all claim to be "environmentalists." Id. at 1000.
2. Keith Saxe, Note, Regulated Taking of Threatened Species Under the Endangered
Species Act, 39 HASNGS L.J. 399, 408 (1988). In 1966, Congress began a course of
action that focused on the threat of species extinction. Id.
Prior to passage of any legislation, Congress had repeatedly been warned
about the severity and cause of the wildlife extinction problem:
[M]an and his technology has [sic] continued at an ever-increasing rate
to disrupt the natural ecosystem. This has resulted in a dramatic rise in
the number and severity of the threats faced by the world's wildlife. The
truth in this is apparent when one realizes that half of the recorded ex-
tinctions of mammals over the past 2,000 years have occurred in the most
recent 50-year period.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 386 (D. Wyo.
1987) (quoting Hearings on Endangered Species before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1973) (statement of Assistant Secretary of
the Interior Nathanial P. Reed)).
3. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994), as amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-44 (West Supp.
1995)).
4. "[P]rojections are that an average of 100 species per day will be vanishing
by the end of the century." Rudy Abramson, Wildlife Act: Shield or Sword?, LA.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at Al. The destruction of habitat which has accompanied
economic development has caused the decline and extinction of numerous spe-
cies. See generally Saxe, supra note 2, at 399-408 (outlining historic decline of Amer-
ican wildlife to modern threats of wildlife survival). One author writes:
(441)
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the protection afforded endangered species under ESA has vio-
lently collided with an industrial and developmental view that gives
economic interests the highest priority.5
Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co.6 illustrates a re-
cent conflict between ESA and economic interests involving the
Northern Spotted Owl and the timber industry.7 The issue ad-
dressed by the Rosboro court was whether ESA permits citizen suits
alleging only a future injury to a protected species.8
Part II begins with a discussion of the statutory background
that led to the enactment of ESA. Then, it addresses how prior
courts have interpreted ESA; focusing particularly on. the ap-
proaches courts have taken as to whether ESA authorizes injunc-
tions against a future injury to a protected species. Part III
discusses the circumstances of Rosboro. Parts IV and V analyze the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of ESA, and the court's holding that
claims of a future injury to a protected species are actionable under
ESA. Part VI considers the implications of Rosboro and the possible
effects of the court's decision.
[B]y tomorrow morning we shall almost certainly have one less species on
Planet Earth than we had this morning. It will not be a charismatic crea-
ture like the tiger. It could well be an obscure insect in the depths of
some remote rainforest. It may even be a creature that nobody has ever
heard of. But it will have gone. A unique form of life will have been
driven from the face of the earth forever.
DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTEcTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION 7 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (quoting NORMAN MYERS, THE SINK-
ING ARK. A NEW LOOK AT THE PROBLEM OF DISAPPEARING SPECIES 3 (1979)).
5. See generally Berschauer, supra note 1, at 1000-06 (discussing clash in values
between conservation and preservation). One commentator suggested two ex-
treme strategies for dealing with the major increase in species extinction in light of
human progress and development. THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES 3 (Bryan G. Nor-
ton ed. 1986).
One strategy is to press forward with the task of technologizing nature.
On this strategy, the human species would strive to increase its indepen-
dence from nature and natural systems by continuing to create artificial
environments and replace the services now derived from natural ecosys-
tems with services derived from technological sources. A second extreme
strategy would be to retreat from technological progress, reverse the
trend toward manmade environments, and try to save as much of as many
remaining natural systems as possible.
Id.
6. 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995).
7. For further discussion of the conflict between the Northern Spotted Owl
and the timber industry, see infra note 190 and accompanying text.
8. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Background
Prior to the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
two wildlife conservation acts had been passed. The first major
Congressional concern for the preservation of endangered species
was addressed by the Endangered Species Preservation Act of
1966.9 The Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary)
to identify the species threatened with extinction, and to acquire
wildlife habitat lands for preservation.' 0 Three years later Congress
enacted the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, which
continued the 1966 Act, while broadening federal involvement in
the preservation of endangered species.'
While the 1966 and 1969 Acts established the foundation for
the federal protection effort, neither Act warranted notable practi-
9. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990. Prior to the 1966 legislation, federal involvement with
endangered species had been quite limited. MICHAFLJ. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 318 (rev. & expanded ed. 1983). Various measures had
previously been enacted (including Lacey Act of 1900, Black Bass Act of 1926, The
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, and Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of
1965). Id. However, these laws were limited in terms of both the nature of wildlife
protected and the nature of protection afforded. Id.; see generally Michael E. Field,
The Evolution of the Wildlife Taking Concept From Its Beginning To Its Culmination in the
Endangered Species Act, 21 Hous. L. REV. 457 (1984) (tracing concept of wildlife
"taking" as it appears in law from its earliest conception to its fullest expression
under Endangered Species Act of 1973).
10. BEAN, supra note 9, at 319-20. The 1966 Act achieved a dual objective. S.
REP. No. 307, supra note 9, at 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2990. First, it
authorized and directed the Secretary to originate and carry out a "comprehensive
program to conserve, restore, and where necessary to bolster wild populations to
propagate selected species of native fish and wildlife, including game and non-
game birds, that he found to be threatened with extinction." Id. Second, the Act
revamped the authorities of the Secretary relating to the management and admin-
istration of the National Wildlife Refuge System. Id.
The 1966 Act was a significant first step in the effort to protect species, but it
had several limitations. BEAN, supra note 9, at 321. For example, the Act did not
prohibit the "taking" of endangered species. Id. The Act did not restrict interstate
commerce in endangered species, and it mandated very little habitat protection.
Id. Finally, the Act applied only to native wildlife, extending no protection to for-
eign species. Id.
11. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 9, at 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2990.
Some of the deficiencies of the 1966 Act were remedied by the 1969 Act. The 1969
Act expanded the 1966 Act in at least three significant respects. Id. First, the 1969
Act authorized the Secretary to list species threatened with worldwide extinction,
and to prohibit their importation into the United States. Id. Second, the Act
adopted an indirect approach to the taking of endangered species by banning the
transportation or sale of wildlife taken in violation of any federal, state, or foreign
law. Id. at 2991. Third, the 1969 Act increased the amount authorized to be appro-
priated to acquire lands for "conserving, protecting, restoring, or propagating any
endangered species." Id.
1996]
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cal impact. 12 By 1973, both Congress and President Nixon realized
that the existing Acts " 'simply [did] not provide the kind of man-
agement tools needed to act early enough to save a vanishing spe-
cies.' ,,1s Despite the limited impact, the Conservation Acts of 1966
and 1969 certified that the federal government had a legitimate in-
terest in the global protection of wildlife threatened with
extinction.14
Various Congressional hearings and proceedings were held in
1973, which ultimately shaped Congress's view of ESA.15 The pro-
ceedings were replete with expressions of concern regarding the
alarming rate of wildlife extinction, and the risk that might lie in
12. SeeJeffery P. Robbins, Note, 21 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 575, 577 (1991).
.The statutes had several critical deficiencies. Id. For example, neither statute con-
tained meaningful enforcement provisions; neither statute addressed habitat de-
struction - the greatest threat to endangered species; and neither statute expressly
prohibited the "taking" of imperilled domestic wildlife. Id.;see also Saxe, supra note
2, at 409 (recognizing flaws inherent in prior Conservation Acts). Testimony of-
fered at legislative hearings on ESA indicated that four requirements must be rem-
edied for the bill to become effective:
(1) The bill must provide the Secretary with sufficient discretion in list-
ing and delisting animals so that he may afford present protection to
those species which are either in present danger of extinction or likely
within the foreseeable future to become so endangered;
(2) the bill must provide protection throughout the nation for animals
which are either endangered or threatened;
(3) the bill must lift the statutory restrictions that existing law places on
authorization of monies for habitat acquisition from the Land and
Water Conservation Fund Act, and extend to the Secretary land acqui-
sition powers for such purposes from existing legislation; and
(4) finally, it became apparent in hearings that many established State
agencies could in the future, or do now provide efficient management
programs for the benefit of endangered species.
S. REP. No. 307, supra note 9, at 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2991.
13. Saxe, supra note 2, at 409 (quoting President's Environmental Message of
February 8, 1972, 8 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 218, 223-24 (Feb. 8, 1972)).
14. Robbins, supra note 12, at 578.
15. In 1972, new endangered species legislation was first introduced into both
houses of Congress. ROHLF, supra note 4, at 23. The dominant theme of Congres-
sional discussion was the need to devote whatever effort and resources were neces-
sary to prevent further reduction of wildlife resources. George Cameron Coggins,
Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D.
L. REv. 315, 321 (1975). The Senate bill passed unanimously in July of 1973.
ROHLF, supra note 4, at 24. An overwhelming majority of the House passed its
version in September of 1973. Id. The Conference Committee adopted most of
the House bill, but retained specific features of the Senate bill. Coggins, supra, at
321. The committee report was issued in December 1973, and adopted by both
Houses without amendment. Id. On December 28, 1973, the President signed the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 into law. Id. See generally ROHLF, supra note 4, at
23-24 (discussing Senate and House bills' proposed legislation prior to ESA's en-
actment); Coggins, supra, at 321-22 (examining Congressional discussion prior to
ESA's enactment).
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the loss of any endangered species.' 6 "Congress was concerned
about the unknown uses that endangered species might have and
about the unforeseeable place. such creatures may have in the chain of
life on this planet."17
B. Endangered Species Act of 1973
In 1973, Congress responded by enacting a revitalized Endan-
gered Species Act.18 In its final version, ESA "represented the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered spe-
cies ever enacted by any nation."19 ESA not only serves to preserve
and protect threatened wildlife, but also recognizes the vital need
to preserve a habitat.20
In developing legislation to protect species at risk, Congress
found that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic
growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
16. Typifying these concerns is the Report of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 37; a bill which contained the essential
features of the subsequently enacted Endangered Species Act of 1973. Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978). The Report stated:
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interests of
mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. The reason is simple :
they are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles we cannot solve,
and may provide answers to questions which we have not yet learned to
ask.
To take a homely, but apt, example: one of the critical chemicals in
the regulation of ovulations in humans was found in a common plant.
Once discovered, and analyzed, humans could duplicate it synthetically,
but had it never existed - or had it been driven out of existence before we
knew its potentialities - we would never had tried to synthesize it in the
first place.
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up ... which may yet be undis-
covered, much less analyzed? . . . Sheer self-interest impels us to be
cautious.
The institutionalization of that caution lies at the heart of H.R. 37.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, pp. 4-5 (1973)) (alteration in original).
17. Id. at 178-79.
18. ESA §§ 2-18, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44.
19. Hill, 437 U.S. at 180. One commentator described ESA as "'the first fed-
eral statute to embody a truly comprehensive federal effort at wildlife preserva-
tion.' " Saxe, supra note 2, at 409 (quoting M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WiLDur LAw 17-18 (rev. ed. 1983)).
20. See ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (describing purposes of ESA); see infra
note 23 (providing statutory language of § 1531 (b)); see Robbins, supra note 12, at
578; see also Lynda Graham Cook, Comment, Lucas and Endangered Species Protection:
When "Take" and "Takings" Collide, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185, 193 (1993) (noting
that ESA demonstrates federal government's desire to protect species).
1996]
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conservation." 21 Based on these findings and the fact that species
preservation is of invaluable importance, Congress enacted ESA.22
As expressed by Congress in the opening paragraphs of ESA, con-
servation of species was a primary goal.2 3
ESA contains several provisions that seek to protect and pre-
serve the habitat of endangered species2 4 and threatened species. 25
The Act authorizes the Secretary to maintain a list of all species in
danger of extinction, and to determine whether any species of wild-
life is endangered or threatened.26 Once a species is listed as en-
21. ESA§ 2(a) (1), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1). Additionally, Congress found that
"other species ... have been so depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or
threatened with extinction." Id. § 2(a) (2), § 1531 (a) (2).
22. "The Congress finds and declares that ... these species of fish, wildlife,
and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and sci-
entific value to the Nation and its people." Id. § 2(a)(3), § 1531(a) (3).
23. The stated purposes of ESA are twofold:
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conserva-
tion of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take
such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the trea-
ties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). For a description of endangered species, see
infra note 24. For the definition of threatened species, see infra note 25.
In furtherance of these purposes, the federal legislature further declared that
it is "to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall
seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their au-
thorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter." ESA § 2(c)(1), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531 (c) (1) (emphasis added). ESA specifically defines "conserve" as "to use and
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessay to bring any endangered species
or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this
chapter are no longer necessary." Id. § 3(3), § 1532(3) (emphasis added).
24. ESA defines "endangered species" as:
[A]ny species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class In-
secta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protec-
tion under the provisions of this chapter would present an
overwhelming and overriding risk to man.
ESA § 3(6), 16 U.S.C § 1532(6). The term "species" is defined to include "any
subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any
species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature." Id. § 3(16),
§ 1532(16). Species of wildlife that have been listed as endangered are located at
50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1993).
25. ESA defines "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant
portion of its range." ESA § 3(20), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). Species of wildlife that
have been listed as threatened are located at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1993).
26. ESA § 4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a). The key determination from which
other consequences of ESA follow is the determination to list a species as endan-
gered or threatened. BEAN, supra note 9, at 334. Due to the significance of that
determination, ESA prescribes a detailed procedure to follow. Id. The listing pro-
cess was revised in both the 1978 and 1982 Endangered Species Act Amendments.
See id. at 335-36 (outlining changes in listing process and explaining reasons for
6
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dangered, it automatically becomes subject to stringent protections
under ESA.27 ESA provides siginificant protection by making it a
crime to "take" any plant or animal listed as an endangered
species. 28
C. The "Taking" Prohibition Under ESA
Under ESA, the "taking" of endangered species is expressly for-
bidden.2 9 This prohibition provides in pertinent part: "it is unlaw-
ful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to
... take any such species within the United States or the territorial
sea of the United States."30 The Act broadly defines "take" as "har-
amendments). Under the current ESA, the Secretary determines whether a spe-
cies is endangered or threatened by any one of the following factors: "the present
or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habit or range;
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
disease or predation; the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or other
natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence." ESA § 4(a) (1) (A)-
(E), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1) (A)-(E). The Secretary also determines the geographi-
cal areas essential to the conservation of listed species, and designates as "critical
habitat" those areas requiring special management. Id. § 3(5), § 1532(5). Once a
species has been classified as endangered or threatened, the Secretary is instructed
to "issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of such species." Id. § 4(d), § 1533(d). Every five years the Secretary
must review all listed species to determine whether the status of those species
should be removed or changed. Id. § 4(c)(2), § 1533(c)(2).
27. Restrictions pertaining to endangered species include prohibitions
against importation, exportation, sale or shipment in interstate commerce in the
course of commercial activity, and possession of any species "taken" in violation of
ESA. ESA § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). All of the prohibitions apply auto-
matically to endangered species, but none apply automatically to threatened spe-
cies. BEAN, supra note 9, at 345. Rather, under ESA, the "Secretary shall issue such
regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of
such [threatened] species." ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
28. ESA § 9(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). For a discussion of penalties imposed on
those who violate ESA's various prohibitions, see infra note 38 and accompanying
text.
29. ESA § 9(a)(1)(B)-(C), 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a) (1) (B)-(C). ESA only prohib-
its the taking of endangered species of fish and wildlife, not the taking of
threatened species of fish and wildlife. See generally Steven G. Davison, Alteration of
Wildlife Habitat As A Prohibited Taking Under The Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND
USE & ENvT. L. 155 (1995) (discussing "takings" of endangered and threatened
species). However, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has adopted a regulation
that provides that it is unlawful for any person to take any listed threatened species
of wildlife. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (a) (1993).
30. ESA § 9(a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The
term "person" is defined broadly as:
an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any
other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or in-
strumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State,
municipality, or political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.
19961 447
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ass," "harm," or one of several other enumerated descriptions.3'
Although ESA does not define any of the terms included within the
definition of the term "take," the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
has promulgated regulations defining the term "harm."3 2
While ESA prohibits the taking of endangered species, Con-
gress has enacted several extremely narrow exceptions to the taking
prohibition.33 In certain circumstances ESA may exempt a person
from the Act's prohibition on takings involved in land development
which modifies or destroys species' habitat.34 For example, the Sec-
retary may permit a taking of wildlife, otherwise prohibited by ESA,
Id. § 3(13), § 1532(13).
31. ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19). "The term 'take' means to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to
engage in any such conduct." Id.
32. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). "Harm" in the definition of "take" "means an act
which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by signifi-
candy impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or shel-
tering." Id. The FWS has also promulgated a regulation defining the term
"harass." Id. "Harass" "means an intentional or negligent act or omission which
creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited
to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering." Id.
The FWS's definition of "harm" recited above is a redefinition effective in
1981. See generally Davison, supra note 29, at 178-98 (discussing FWS's regulation
defining "harm"). FWS's original regulation of "harm" was promulgated on Sep-
tember 26, 1975. Id. FWS's original promulgation defined "harm" as follows:
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the [ESA] means an act or
omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which an-
noy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral
patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or shel-
tering; significant environmental modification or degradation which has
such effects is included within the meaning of "harm" . ...
Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1975)). The 1975 definition was amended in 1981.
For further discussion of the 1981 "harm" regulation and its accompanying legisla-
tive history, see infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
33. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("Congress
has drawn several extraordinarily narrow exceptions to the [ESA's] prohibitions.").
34. See Davison, supra note 29, at 164-65 (discussing exemptions from ESA's
"takings" prohibitions).
8
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if the taking is incidental to lawful activities,3 5 or if the taking is for
scientific purposes.3 6
Two types of enforcement are authorized for violations of
ESA's prohibitions.3 7 Public enforcement, through which criminal
35. ESA § 10(a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1) (B). This provision states:
"The Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he shall prescribe
... any taking otherwise prohibited ... if such taking is incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." Id. To obtain an
incidental "takings" permit, a person must present a habitat conservation plan
(HCP) to the FWS that specifies -
(i) the impact that will likely result from such taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such
impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement such
steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered
and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being
necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.
ESA §§ 10 (a) (2) (A) (i)-(iv), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a) (2) (A) (i)-(iv).
After opportunity for public comment, a permit will be issued if the Secretary
finds the plan satisfactory, and determines that:
(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize
and mitigate the impacts of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will
be provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the sur-
vival and recovery of the species in the wild; and
(v) the measures, if any, required under subparagraph (A) (iv) will
be met.
ESA §§ 10(a) (2) (B) (i)-(v), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a) (2) (B) (i)-(v); see also Defenders of
Wildlife v. Administrator, EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing
incidental "take" requirements and applying requirements to continued registra-
tion of strychnine pesticide). Although an incidental "takings" permit may allow
land development to modify or destroy wildlife, submission of an HCP can be
costly, complicated, and time-consuming. Davison, supra note 29, at 166 (citing
Robert D. Thornton, The Search for a Conservation Planning Paradigm: Section 10 of the
ESA, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 21 (1993)). See generally Richard E. Webster,
Habitat Conservation Plans Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 243
(1987) (examining development and implementation of HCP in accordance with
ESA).
36. ESA § 10(a) (1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1) (A). The statute provides that
"[t]he Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he shall prescribe
... any act otherwise prohibited .. . for scientific purposes or to enhance the
propagation or survival of the affected species, including, but not limited to, acts
necessary for the establishment and maintenance of experimental populations
.... .Id.; see also ESA § 10(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (permitting Indians, Aleuts, or
Eskimos who are Alaskan Natives residing in Alaska and, in some circumstances,
other non-native permanent residents of Alaskan native villages, to "take" endan-
gered or threatened species, but only if "taking" is primarily for subsistence pur-
poses and only subject to such regulations as Secretary may issue upon
determination that such "taking" materially and negatively affect species).
37. See generally BEAN, supra note 9, at 373-74 (discussing public and private
enforcement of ESA); Coggins, supra note 15, at 335-36 (discussing citizen suits
under ESA).
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or civil penalties are imposed, is monitored by the Secretary and
the Department of Justice.38 The power to enjoin ESA violations
may also be exercised by private citizens under ESA's citizen suit
provision.3 9 This liberal citizen suit provision authorizes any person
to enjoin any other person from violating a provision of the Act.40
D. Development of Case Law
The courts reacted rapidly to the enactment of ESA. 41 Early
judicial interpretation supported a narrow reading of the Act's lan-
38. Penalties are imposed on those who violate ESA's various prohibitions.
BEAN, supra note 9, at 346-48. Penalties differ depending on the violator's state of
knowledge, whether the violation concerns an endangered or threatened species,
and in some instances, the violator's business. Id. Penalties include fines up to
$50,000; imprisonment; possible revocation or suspension of federal leases, per-
mits, or licenses; and forfeiture of any guns, equipment, vessels, aircraft or vehicles
used in the unlawful activity. See ESA § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540. The Act also autho-
rizes the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief against violators. Id. § 11 (e) (6),
§ 1540(e) (6). "The Attorney General of the United States may seek to enjoin any
person who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of [ESA] or regulation
issued under authority thereof." Id.
39. ESA's citizen suit provision is located at ESA § 1l(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
See infra note 40 (providing statutory language of citizen suit provision).
40. ESA § lI(g)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf.., to
enjoin any person, including the United States and any other govern-
mental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of any provision of [ESA] or regulation issued under the author-
ity thereof.
Id. (emphasis added). The citizen suit provision also authorizes suits to compel
the Secretary to perform any nondiscretionary duty with respect to the listing of
species. Id. § 11(g)(1)(C), § 1540(g)(1)(C).
Before anyone may commence a civil suit, ESA requires that she or he give
written notice of an intention to do so to the Secretary and alleged violators. Id.
§ 11 (g) (2) (A), § 1540(g) (2) (A). This enables the Secretary to begin appropriate
action against the alleged violator, or if the Secretary himself is the alleged viola-
tor, to remedy the violation. BEAN, supra note 9, at 374. ESA specifies that notice
must be given at least 60 days prior to commencing a suit. ESA § 11 (g) (2) (A) (i),
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2) (A) (i). For various reasons, many courts have not required
strict compliance with this time restriction. BEAN, supra note 9, at 374 (discussing
courts' justifications for ignoring this requirement, including: newness of statute;
compliance with spirit of notice requirement; waiver by defendants; and assertion
that citizen suit provision is not sole remedy for ESA violations). Finally, the citi-
zen suit provision authorizes the award of attorney's fees and other litigation costs
to any party, whenever a court determines such award to be appropriate. ESA
§ ll(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)( 4 ).
41. Environmental organizations sensed ESA was a new tool they could utilize
to further their goals and they acted quickly. Robbins, supra note 12, at 579. For
example, nine months after ESA was enacted, the Sierra Club amended its com-
plaint in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d
1289 (8th Cir. 1976), to allege a violation of ESA. Id. at n.32. In Froehlke, the Sierra
Club filed suit to halt construction of the Meramac Park Lake Dam Project in
Missouri. Froehlike, 392 F. Supp. at 131. Sierra Club claimed that the project would
10
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guage which allowed the courts to construe ESA "reasonably."42
Subsequent courts, however, broadly interpreted ESA, ruling that
Congress intended endangered species to be granted the highest
priority.43 The broad interpretation theory was brought before the
Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.44 In that case,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding that the
plain language and legislative history of ESA warranted an expan-
sive interpretation. 45 Hill represented the Supreme Court's ap-
proval of the broad interpretation given ESA by a majority of the
recent judicial opinions.46
In addition to providing precedent for future courts as to the
proper interpretation of ESA, Hill significantly impacted the debate
of whether ESA authorizes suits that allege only future injury to pro-
tected wildlife. Conflict between ESA and "progress" was inevitable,
and arose dramatically in Hill.47 The Supreme Court determined
that the plain language of ESA required halting the completion of a
$100 million dam to save the snail darter, a plain three-inch fish.48
jeopardize the existence of the endangered Indiana bat by destroying its habitat.
Id. at 143.
42. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). In the appel-
late court decision of Froehlke, the Eighth Circuit stressed that ESA must be con-
strued reasonably. Id. at 1304. The court ultimately held that since only a few bats
would be affected, no violation of the Act existed. Id. at 1305. The narrow reading
of the Act's language permitted the court to ensure a "reasonable" outcome. See
id. at 1301.
43. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 169-70 (D.D.C.
1977) (construing ESA broadly so that FWS regulations governing hunting of mi-
gratory game birds were held invalid).
44. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In Hill, citizens and conservation groups sued the
TVA to permanently halt the completion of an 80% constructed dam over the
Little Tennessee River. Id. at 172. The group alleged that completion of the dam
would stop the free flow of waters, and destroy the critical habitat of the snail
darter - a three inch long fish that lived in the waters of the Tennessee River. Id. at
158. They further alleged that the dam would put the existence of the species in
jeopardy. Id. at 166.
45. The Court emphasized that "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting
the statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever
the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally
every section of the statute." Id. at 184.
46. Id.
47. For a discussion of the facts in Hi4 see supra note 44 and infra note 48.
48. Hil 437 U.S. at 172-73. The Secretary formally listed the snail darter as
an endangered species, on October 8, 1975. Id. at 161. It was noted that " 'the
snail darter is a living entity which is genetically distinct and reproductively isolated
from other fishes.'" Id. (quoting Fed. Reg. 47505 (1975)). The Secretary deter-
mined that the snail darter lives only in the portion of the Tennessee River which
would be completely inundated as a consequence of the construction of the dam.
Id. The Secretary subsequently declared the area of the river which would be af-
fected by the dam to be the "critical habitat" of the snail darter. Id. at 162. Even
though TVA had expended billions of dollars in the dam project, and neared com-
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In reaching its decision, the Court adopted a standard that priori-
tizes preservation of endangered species, instead of applying the
traditional test of balancing parties' interests. 49 The Court noted
that Congress has made it "abundantly clear that the balance has
been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of
priorities."50 Consequently, the Court did not require the plaintiffs
to establish that defendant's activities had already killed or injured
a snail darter.51
Since 4ill, courts have taken various approaches in determin-
ing whether ESA authorizes injunctions against a future injury to a
protected species. 52 The debate often focuses on ESA's definition
pletion, the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to issue a permanent injunc-
tion to halt the dam's operation, since it threatened to destroy the snail darter's
critical habitat. Id. at 172.
49. The Court stated that the "language, history, and structure" of ESA
demonstrated Congress' determination that the balance of hardships and the pub-
lic interest tip heavily in favor of endangered species. Id. at 174, 187-88, 194-95.
"Thus, Congress removed from the courts their traditional equitable discretion in
injunction proceedings." Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927,
933 (9th Cir. 1988). " 'We may not use equity's scales to strike a different bal-
ance.'" Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987)).
50. Hill 437 U.S. at 194; see also Berschauer, supra note 1, at 997 n.48
("[E]conomic interests must yield to the conservation of an endangered or
threatened species when a determination has been made that a species will be
"taken" ... as defined under the Act").
Hill has repeatedly been cited by subsequent courts to demonstrate the weight
Congress placed on the protection of endangered and threatened species. E.g.,
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Turner, No. CIV.A.91-2201 (MB), 1991 WL 206232
(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1991) (mem.). In Fund for Animals, plaintiffs sought to enjoin
defendants from authorizing a sport hunt of the grizzly bear in Northwestern Mon-
tana. Id. at *1. It was estimated that three bears would be "taken" during the hunt.
Id. at *8. Even though there was not even a remote possibility that the hunt would
eradicate the species, the court concluded that Congressional intent of ESA must
prevail. Id. (citing Hill 437 U.S. at 174). In light of the Congressional mandate,
the court concluded that the possible loss of only a few grizzly bears "taken"
through the hunt, amounted to a significant and irreparable "harm." Id. Accord-
ingly, the court issued an order enjoining federal defendants from authorizing the
sport hunting of grizzly bears. Id. at *9.
51. Hi/4 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Evidence that showed the dam would destroy
the snail darter in the future provided sufficient basis for the injunction. Id. In
1978, Congress responded to the Hill decision by amending ESA. See Endangered
Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95632, 92 Stat. 3751. Although the
amendments provided an exemption process for projects deemed to be of over-
whelming importance, the Tellico Dam project did not pass the process. See ESA
§ 7(h), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h); see also Richard E. Webster, Habitat Conservation Plans
under the Endangered Species Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 243, 246 n.22 (1987) (noting
that ultimately, legislation permitted dam to be completed). Despite the exemp-
tion process provision of ESA, the strength of Hill continues today. Id. at 246.
52. For a discussion of the various approaches courts have taken in determin-
ing whether ESA authorizes injunctions against a future injury to a protected spe-
cies, see infra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
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of "take," and the scope of the term "harm," as defined in the "tak-
ing" definition.5 3
There has been considerable conflict among the courts regard-
ing the validity of enjoining actions that pose a future or imminent
threat of injury to protected species. Several cases support the con-
clusion that Congress intended to authorize plaintiffs to enjoin
such actions, while other cases appear to prohibit such a conclu-
sion.54 In other cases, it remains uncertain whether a court would
enjoin an action that poses a future threat of injury.55
A frequently cited Ninth Circuit opinion supports the assertion
that ESA authorizes petitioners to enjoin an imminent threat of in-
jury to endangered species. In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land
& Natural Resources,56 the court held that habitat degradation that
could result in extinction of an endangered species constituted
harm, and thus, a taking within the meaning of ESA.57 In Palila,
the Sierra Club and other environmental parties brought an action
under ESA on behalf of the Palila.58 The plaintiffs claimed that the
State's practice of maintaining sheep in the Palila's critical habitat
The precise issue in FCC v. Rosboro Lumber Co., the case at issue in this Note, is
"whether the district court correctly interpreted ESA to foreclose citizen suits that
only allege a future injury to a protected species." 50 F.3d 781 at 783. For a discus-
sion of ESA's citizen suit provision, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
No other court has addressed precisely whether ESA § 11(g) (citizen suit provi-
sion) precludes suits over wholly future ESA provisions. Brief for Appellee at 26,
Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995)
(No. 94-35070) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
53. For a definition and discussion of the term "take" under ESA, see supra
notes 29-31 and accompanying text. For a definition and discussion concerning
"harm," see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of cases supporting the conclusion that Congress in-
tended to enjoin actions that pose a future threat of injury to protected species,
see infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of cases that pro-
hibit the assertion that Congress intended such enjoinment, see infra notes 65-74
and accompanying text.
55. These cases that appear uncertain as to whether a court would enjoin an
action that posed a future threat of injury to a protected species involve ongoing or
continuous violations of ESA. See infra note 79 (discussing cases of ongoing ESA
violations). Since those cases involve a past violation that continued into the fu-
ture, it is difficult to determine whether the court would hold similarly if no viola-
tion occurred.
56. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). Contra Sweet Home Chapter of Communi-
ties for a Greater Or. v. Babbit, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), modifying per curiam 1
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
57. 852 F.2d at 1110.
58. The Palila is a six-inch long finch-billed bird found only on the slopes of
Mauna Kea on the Island of Hawaii. Id. at 1107. As an endangered species under
ESA, the bird has legal status and can "wing[ ] its way into federal court as a plain-
tiff in its own right." Id.
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constituted an unlawful taking under ESA.59 The circuit court con-
cluded that habitat destruction which could drive the Palila to ex-
tinction falls within the interpretation of harm. 60
59. Id. The plaintiff's original action claimed that feral goats and sheep that
were allowed to run wild in the Palila's critical habitat amounted to a "taking"
under ESA. Id. The district court found in favor of plaintiffs, and ordered the
Department to remove the animals because they were destroying the mamane-naio
woodlands, upon which the Palila depend. Id. In 1984, plaintiffs reopened the
original proceeding, by amending its complaint, to add mouflon sheep as destruc-
tive animals to be removed from the Palila's habitat. Id. In 1986, the district court
ruled in favor of plaintiffs finding that the presence of the sheep "harmed" the
Palila within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. See id.; see supra note 32 and accom-
panying text discussing the C.F.R. definition of "harm." The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's finding, but for reasons different than those stated in
the district court's opinion. Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107, 1110.
60. Palila, 852 F.2d at 1108. The State Department of Land and Natural Re-
sources (Department) contended that the district court construed the definition
of "harm" in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 too broadly. Id. at 1107-08. The Department argued
that "actual harm" only includes those activities which result in immediate destruc-
tion to the Palila; thus, challenging the finding that habitat destruction which could
drive the Palila to extinction constituted harm. Id. at 1108. The Ninth Circuit
confronted this issue recognizing that the scope of the definition of "harm" was
significant since it "sets the limit on what acts... violate the [ESA's] prohibition
against "taking" an endangered species." Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court
focused on the Secretary's promulgations of a revised definition of harm. Id. In
the promulgation notice, the Secretary let stand the district court's interpretation
of harm. Id. (construing harm to include habitat destruction that could result in
extinction of Palila). For a discussion of the Secretary's original 1975 promulga-
tion of "harm," and 1981 amended version of "harm," see supra note 32.
The Ninth Circuit further supported the Secretary's interpretation of "harm"
because it follows the plain language of ESA, serves the overall purpose of ESA,
and is consistent with the policy of ESA as evidenced by the legislative history.
Palila, 852 F.2d at 1108. Contra Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbit, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), modifying per curiam, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407
(1995).
While the Ninth Circuit determined in Palila that the FWS's "harm" definition
was a permissible interpretation of ESA, Sweet Home rejected Palia, creating a split
among the Circuits. Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1478. On March 11, 1994, the D.C.
Circuit held the FWS's "harm" regulation invalid. Id. at 1472. In that case, Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, and other parties who were
dependent on the forest products industry had previously sued to invalidate a
number of FWS regulations under ESA. Id. at 1464. Originally, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia found the regulations valid, and plain-
tiffs appealed. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993). On
petition for rehearing, the D.C. Circuit held that the FWS regulation defining
"harm" was invalid. 17 F.3d at 1472. The court found that the "harm" definition
was neither clearly authorized by Congress nor a "reasonable interpretation" of the
statute. Id. at 1464 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Sweet Home was thus in direct conflict with Palila.
Id. at 1478; see also Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1313 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) (noting conflict in circuits created by Sweet Home). On June 25, 1995,
the Supreme Court reversed the Sweet Home decision. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (up-
holding Secretary's definition of "harm"). See generally, Dr. Nancy Grief, Is Habitat
Modification that Kills or Injures Endangered Wildlife a Prohibited Taking Under the En-
dangered Species Act?, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 189 (1995) (discussing Palila decisions
in conjunction with Sweet Home decisions).
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Further support that a mere likelihood of future injury is suffi-
cient to state a "harm" violation and obtain an injunction is found
in National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern Railroad, Inc.61
In Burlington, petitioners claimed that the actions of Burlington
Northern Railroad, Inc. (Burlington) constituted a prohibited "tak-
ing" under ESA. 62 The Ninth Circuit held that to prevail under a
takings argument, petitioners must prove that there is a reasonable
likelihood of future harm to the protected species.63 The court
concluded that it is not necessary to show future harm with "cer-
tainty;" however, it is necessary to show that future harm is "suffi-
ciently likely."14
Other cases have taken a stricter approach in determining
what is necessary to constitute enjoinable harm. These cases de-
mand proof that a defendant's actions caused actual harm to wild-
61. 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994).
62. Id. at 1509. In 1988-89, three Burlington trains carrying corn derailed in
northwestern Montana, spilling approximately 10,000 tons of corn. Id. at 1510.
The corn spill attracted grizzly bears to the site to feed. Id. By October 1990, at
least seven bears in northwestern Montana were killed by the Burlington trains. Id.
The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) and Great Bear Foundation filed
suit, claiming that Burlington's acts constituted a "taking" of grizzly bears in viola-
tion of ESA. Id. at 1509-10. NWF alleged that Burlington violated ESA when the
trains struck and killed the grizzlies, which were allegedly attracted to the corn
supply. Id. NWF further claimed that the corn spills violated ESA by modifying
grizzly bear feeding behavior and "harming" the grizzlies and their habitat. Id.
63. Id. at 1509. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the bear fatalities constituted a
"prohibited taking" under ESA, but concluded that NWF did not demonstrate
enough likelihood of future injury to the bears tojustify an injunction. Id. Burling-
ton was a preliminary injunction case, however, the principles are applicable to
cases under ESA. See id. at 1510 (discussing preliminary injunctions under ESA).
64. Id. at 1512. The court clarified:
We are not saying that a threat of extinction to the species is re-
quired before an injunction may issue under ESA. This would be
contrary to the spirit of the statute, whose goal of preserving
threatened and endangered species can also be achieved through
incremental steps. However, what we require is a definitive threat of
future harm to protected species, not mere speculation.
Id. at 1512 n.8; see also Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343
(N.D. Cal. 1995), appeal dismissed sub nom. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbit, 61 F.3d 911
(9th Cir. 1995). In Marbled Murrelet, the Environmental Protection Information
Center, Inc. (EPIC) and the marbled murrelet, an endangered seabird, brought
suit against Pacific Lumber Co. (Pacific) to enjoin the implementation of Pacific's
timber harvest plan. Id. at 1344. Plaintiffs contended that Pacific's harvesting of
137 acres in the marbled murrelet's habitat would result in a taking of the species.
Id. at 1345. The District Court asserted that to prevail in an injunctive action
under ESA, "[fluture harm to a species need not be shown with certainty... but
'mere speculation' will not suffice." Id. at 1367 (quoting Burlington, 23 F.3d at
1512 n.8). Since plaintiffs established that Pacific's proposed timber harvest would
impose a definite threat of future harm to the marbled murrelet, the court or-
dered the permanent injunction. Id.
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life.65 A notable decision issued by the First Circuit, American Bald
Eagle v. Bhatti, held that even a "significant risk" of future injury is
not harm and does not allow an activity to be enjoined.66 In this
case, the court dismissed an ESA taking claim, that deer hunting
should be enjoined due to the potential risk to threatened bald ea-
gles. 6 7 The court concluded that the proper standard for establish-
ing a taking under ESA has been "unequivocally defined as a
showing of 'actual harm.' "68
Adopting a restrictive view of "taking," additional courts have
dismissed "future risk of takings claims,"69 and others have required
65. See cases cited infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
66. 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993).
67. Id. at 166-67. The Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife oper-
ates a restoration project for bald eagles on Quabbin Reservation. Id. at 164. Leg-
islation was enacted by the State of Massachusetts to permit a limited deer hunt at
Quabbin under the Metropolitan District Commission's authority. Id. Appellants
filed suit to enjoin the limited deer hunt, on the ground that it constituted a pro-
hibited taking of the bald eagle, an endangered species, under ESA. Id. Appel-
lants alleged that:
[S] ome of the deer shot by hunters during the Quabbin hunt would
not be recovered but would die thereafter within the feeding area of
the Quabbin bald eagles; these deer... would contain lead in their
bodies from the lead slugs used by the hunters as ammunition; and
bald eagles would feed on these unrecovered deer carcasses, con-
sume a portion of the lead in the deer, and be harmed by the lead.
Id. The district court denied the preliminary injunction concluding that appel-
lants failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Id. An ap-
peal followed, and the First Circuit affirmed. Id. at 167.
68. Id. at 165. Appellants asked the court to establish a numerical standard
for determining which actions constitute a "taking" of protected wildlife. Id. The
First Circuit rejected the request, finding nothing in ESA, its regulations, or legisla-
tive history to support an arbitrary numerical standard. Id. The court, instead,
held that "[c]learly ... for there to be 'harm' under the ESA, there must be actual
injury to the listed species." Id. at 166 (emphasis added). Since there was no evi-
dence in the record of harm to the bald eagles from the deer hunt, the court
dismissed the action. Id.
The First Circuit applied a strict interpretation of ESA, and rejected the dis-
trict court's liberal interpretation. Id. The district court stated that in order for
plaintiffs to prevail they must show that the deer hunt posed a significant risk of
harm to the bald eagle. Id. at 166 n.5. The First Circuit expressly rejected this
liberal requirement, adopting a more demanding burden. Id. at 166 & 166 n.5
("By requiring the plaintiffs to show only a 'significant risk of harm' instead of
'actual harm,' the district court required a lower degree of certainty of harm than
we interpret the ESA to require.").
69. See Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 430 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (denying in-
junction in ESA citizen suit where there was no proof that "defendant['s] [con-
struction] project will constitute a 'taking' of the Perdido Key beach mouse")
(emphasis added); State of California By and Through Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp.
1359, 1387-88 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd inpart, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (noting that "threat [of a taking] would still not
constitute a 'taking' under the [ESA]" because "in prohibiting 'taking,' the drafts-
men of the [ESA] envisioned a more immediate injury"); North Slope Borough v.
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 362 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d
16
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actual injury to wildlife to constitute a prohibited "taking."70 In Pyr-
amid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Department of NaVy,7 1
the Ninth Circuit rejected an ESA "taking" claim where the plaintiff
did not prove that the challenged action "actually caused" any in-
jury to the cui-ui, an endangered species of fish.72 On account of
the evidence failing to demonstrate that defendant's actions had
harmed the cui-ui, the court concluded that there was no "taking"
under ESA.73 In dismissing ESA claims without considering future
"takings," several cases, including prevalent Ninth Circuit opinions,
have determined that "harm" itself requires proof of a current
injury.74
Jurisprudence focusing on citizen suits under ESA has been
sparse.75 The Supreme Court has not ruled on ESA's citizen suit
provision. However, the Court interpreted identical language in
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation.76  In
Gwaltney, the Supreme Court construed the meaning of the citizen
589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emphasizing that ESA "do[es] not require the government
to halt all activity merely because there is a possibility that agency action will result in a
'taking' at some future time") (emphasis added); cf. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land
& Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that im-
mediate injury is necessary to constitute ESA "taking").
70. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of Navy,
898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
71. 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
72. Id. at 1420. The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians alleged that the
Navy's practice of leasing acreage and contiguous water rights to local Nevada
farmers was in violation of ESA. Id. at 1412. The Indians alleged that this practice
seriously threatened the continued viability of an endangered species of fish, the
cui-ui, by contributing to a significant decrease in the water level of Pyramid Lake.
Id. at 1420-21. The district court held that the Navy's actions were not in violation
of the Act, and the Tribe appealed. Id. at 1414.
73. Id. at 1420 ("Because the evidence does not demonstrate that the Navy's
outlease program has 'harmed' the cui-ui, we note that there is no 'taking' under
[ESA]."); see also Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 25 F.3d 1443 (9th
Cir. 1994), amended, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994) (court refused to ban all salmon
fishing as ESA "takings" where there was only potential risk that any given fish
harvesting operation would "take" protected salmon species).
74. See Pyramid Lake, 898 F.2d at 1420; see also Swan View Coalition, Inc. v.
Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 939-40 (D. Mont. 1992) ("harm" requires proof that
challenged action "is actually killing or injuring grizzly bears"); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 389 (D. Wyo. 1987) (dismissing
grizzly bear taking claim at summaryjudgement where "there were no bear mortal-
ities" over past year).
75. For a discussion of the citizen suit provision of ESA, see supra notes 39-40
and accompanying text. The citizen suit provision only provides jurisdiction over a
suit against a person "who is alleged to be in violation" of ESA. ESA § ll(g), 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g).
76. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
1996]
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suit provision of the Clean Water Act.77 The Court held that the
most natural reading of the language in the citizen suit provision
requires "plaintiffs [to] allege a state of either continuous or inter-
mittent violation - that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past pol-
luter will continue to pollute in the future."7  Cases following
Gwaltney have adopted a similar approach. 79
III. FACTS
In 1992, Rosboro Lumber Company (Rosboro) applied for a
permit to harvest timber located on private lands in Oregon.80 The
Oregon Department of Forestry granted the permit, but noted that
the proposed activity would occur on land adjacent to the 1991
nesting site of a pair of Northern Spotted Owls.8 ' To cut the timber
77. Under the Clean Water Act, "private citizens may commence civil actions
against any person 'alleged to be in violation of the conditions of either a federal or
state ... permit." Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 54 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)) (em-
phasis added). Comparing the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act with
the citizen suit provision of ESA, it is apparent that the language contained in both
provisions is virtually identical. See ESA § 11 (g) (1) (A), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1) (A)
(ESA's citizen suit provision). "[A]ny person may commence a civil suit . .. to
enjoin any person . . .who is alleged to be in violation of [ESA]." Id. (emphasis
added). For further discussion of ESA's citizen suit provision, see supra notes 39-
40 and accompanying text.
78. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58. The Supreme Court held that the Clean Water
Act does not permit citizen suits for wholly past violations. Id. at 65. While the fact
pattern in Gwaltney elicited that precise holding, the Supreme Court reached a
broader "natural reading" of the statutory language contained in ESA's citizen suit
provision. See id.; see also Brief for Appellee, at 24. The Court concluded that "citi-
zens... may seek civil penalties only in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate
an ongoing violation." Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 853 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.
1988) (concluding that use of present tense "alleged to be in violation" only allows
suits to abate ongoing violations); Washington PIRG v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11
F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that "citizen suits can address only
ongoing violations" (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 49)).
80. Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 782
(9th Cir. 1995). Rosboro (Defendant-Appellee) applied to the Oregon Depart-
ment of Forestry for a permit to clearcut approximately 40 acres of timber on land
situated in Lane County, Oregon. Id. The application indicated that the activity
would occur in an area that was a " 'threatened or endangered species site.'" Id.
81. Id. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) determined the Northern
Spotted Owl to be a threatened species pursuant to ESA. 55 Fed. Reg. 123, 26114
(1990). For a definition of "threatened species" under ESA, see supra note 25.
The FWS noted that the Northern Spotted Owl is threatened throughout its range,
due to the loss and adverse modification of its habitat. The owl's habitat has been
effected by timber harvesting, and aggravated by such disastrous events as fire,
volcanic eruption and wind storms. 55 Fed. Reg. 123, 26114. The FWS's rule thus
extended ESA's protection to the Northern Spotted Owl. Id. The rule took effect
July 23, 1990. Id.
In Rosboro, the Oregon Department of Forestry prepared a forest inspection
report when granting Rosboro's permit. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 782. In addition to
18
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at the proposed site, it was necessary for Rosboro to travel over fed-
erally administered land.82
In June 1992, the Federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
authorized Rosboro to build an access road over the federal land.
Although the road permit was approved, the BLM commented that
construction of the project would occur within a half mile of the
nesting site of spotted owls in Swartz Creek.83 Consequently, BLM
warned Rosboro that its project may result in an incidental "taking"
of the owls. 84 Rosboro never applied for an incidental "taking" per-
mit, but proceeded to build the access road during the summer of
1992.85
On September 9, 1992, Forest Conservation Council (FCC)
filed a citizen suit86 against Rosboro, seeking to enjoin the logging
company from clearcutting the timber on private land.8 7 The dis-
trict court concluded that ESA requires a plaintiff to show either a
noting that Rosboro's activity would occur on land adjacent to the owls' nesting
site, the report indicated that Rosboro's compliance with the State of Oregon's
forest practice rules would not necessarily meet the requirements of ESA. Id. For
a discussion of requirements under ESA, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
82. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 782. Rosboro applied for a permit from the Federal
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to build a road over its land. Id.
83. The record indicates that timber harvest on the private land would occur
130 feet away from the Northern Spotted Owls' nest. Brief for Appellee, at 3. The
published Ninth Circuit opinion indicated that BLM authorized Rosboro to build
the access road in June 1991. However, given the corresponding dates and events
that occurred, it is believed that the correct date is June 1992. See Rosboro, 50 F.3d
at 782.
84. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 782. ESA protects endangered species by making it
unlawful to "take" any such species. ESA § 9(a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B);
see supra notes 29-31 for a discussion and pertinent language of the statutory "tak-
ing" prohibition; see also supra note 29 (indicating that FWS has adopted regulation
that prohibits "taking" of threatened species).
85. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783. ESA provides an exception to the federal ban on
taking of protected species. ESA § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. 1539(a) (permitting anyone
who plans to engage in activity that will result in "incidental take" to apply for
permit from FWS); see supra note 35 and accompanying text for discussion and
pertinent statutory language of this exception. In granting Rosboro permission to
construct the access road, BLM advised Rosboro of its responsibility to first obtain
an incidental take permit from FWS. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783.
86. FCC sued Rosboro under the citizen suit provision of ESA (ESA
§ 11(g) (1) (A), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A)). Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 782.
87. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783. FCC alleged that because Rosboro failed to apply
for an incidental take permit, its proposed logging activity constituted a take in
violation of ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B). Id. In support of its
allegation, FCC offered evidence to show that Rosboro's proposed timber harvest
is "reasonably certain to injure the Swartz Creek owl pair by significantly impairing
their essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, and sheltering."
Id. at 783.
FCC sued Rosboro in the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon. Id. FCC and Rosboro subsequently filed cross motions for summary judge-
ment. Id. On November 18, 1993, the district court denied FCC's motion for
1996]
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past or current injury to a protected species.8 8 Accordingly, the
court held that FCC's claim of a future injury to the Northern Spot-
ted Owls was insufficient to establish a "taking" under ESA.89
FCC appealed the district court's order granting judgment in
favor of Rosboro.90 The Ninth Circuit reversed, and held that ESA
permits citizen suits to enjoin future harm to protected species. 91
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The issue addressed in Rosboro was whether the correct inter-
pretation of ESA forecloses citizen suits alleging only future injury
to a protected species. 92 In rejecting this contention, the Ninth Cir-
cuit focused on the statutory language, purpose, and structure of
ESA, in addition to applicable case law. 93
Before elaborating on ESA and relevant case law, the court first
determined that the dispute involved the scope of the term "harm"
as used in ESA.94 The court then identified the main contentions
of the parties. Rosboro claimed that "harm" only includes actions
that constitute a past or current. injury to a protected species, or
actions that threaten such species with extinction. 95 Alternatively,
summaryjudgement, and granted Rosboro's motion for summaryjudgement. Ros-
boro, 50 F.3d at 783.
88. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783. FCC only alleged a future injury to the Swartz
Creek Northern Spotted Owls, and did not claim that Rosboro's activity would
threaten the species extinction; therefore, the district court concluded that FCC's
suit was premature. Id.
89. Id. at 782. The district court's holding was based on the taking provision
of ESA (ESA § 9(a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B)). Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 788. The Ninth Circuit held that FCC's suit to enjoin Rosboro's
timber harvest is actionable under ESA. Id. On account of conflicting facts as to
whether the timber harvest is "reasonably certain to impair the Swartz Creek owl
pair's essential behavioral patterns," the Ninth Circuit remanded for an appropri-
ate finding on that issue. Id.
92. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon construed ESA
to foreclose citizen suits alleging only a future injury. Id. at 783. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit addressed whether this is the proper interpretation of ESA. Id.
93. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of ESA's statutory
language, see infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
court's analysis of ESA's purpose, see infra notes 111-116 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the structure of ESA, see infra
notes 117-123 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Rosboro court's focus
on case law, see infra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.
94. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783. The court made this determination by first noting
that ESA makes it unlawful for anyone to "take" any endangered or threatened
species pursuant to ESA § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538. Id. The court then recited ESA's
definition of "take" as laid out in ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) ("'Take' is
defined to mean .. .'harm' .... ) Id.
95. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783.
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FCC contended that "harm" includes actions that pose an immi-
nent threat of injury to a protected species, including habitat modi-
fications impeding the recovery of such species. 96 The Ninth
Circuit adopted FCC's view, concluding that ESA authorizes citizens
to seek an injunction against an imminent threat of harm to a pro-
tected species.
A. Statutory Language
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the statutory language
by considering the plain language of ESA's "taking" and "harm"
provisions. 97 Turning to ESA's legislative history for guidance in
interpreting the statutory provisions, the court determined that
"take" is to be interpreted broadly.98 By drawing a connection be-
tween ESA provisions at issue, the court determined that an immi-
nent threat of harm to a species easily falls within the broad scope
of Congress's definition of "take." 99
Rosboro relied on the Secretary's definition of harm, which re-
quires "actual" injury to wildlife, to support the contention that an
injunction can be issued only against injuries that have already oc-
curred, or are presently ongoing.100 Further, Rosboro argued that
the plain meaning of the term "actually" requires a petitioner to
establish that a challenged activity already caused, or presently is
causing, an injury to wildlife. 10 1 Rosboro, therefore, asserted that
claims of a future injury are not actionable. 102 The Ninth Circuit
was not persuaded and dismissed Rosboro's argument after review-
96. Id. at 784.
97. Id. at 784. The court reiterated that it is unlawful for anyone to take a
protected species. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 30 (stating relevant statu-
tory language of "taking"). The court then turned to the term "harm," finding
that "[ESA] defines 'take' as any action that.. . 'harms' wildlife." Rosboro, 50 F.3d
at 784 (citing ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19)).
98. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784. The legislative history stated: " 'Take' is to be 'de-
fined in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a
person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife.' " Id. (quoting S. RP.
No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.CA.N. 2989, 2995).
99. Id. "It is clearly conceivable that one can inflict great harm on a protected
species by creating an imminent threat of harm to that species. Such a threat
therefore falls easily within the broad scope of Congress' definition of 'take.' " Id.
100. Id. at 784-85. In 1981, the Secretary issued a re-definition of the term
"harm." Id. "Harm in the definition of 'take' ... means an act which actually kills
or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degra-
dation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." Id. at 784 (quoting
50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
101. Id. at 784.
102. Id.
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ing prior legislative history.103 The court stated that the Secretary's
use of the term "actually" was not intended to foreclose claims of an
imminent threat of injury.10 4 Rather, the court noted that the Sec-
retary inserted the "actually kills or injures wildlife" phrase to pre-
vent claims involving only habitat modification, without any
attendant requirement of death or injury to protected species. 0 5
The court concluded that since there was no evidence in the legisla-
tive history that required a present or prior injury, claims of future
injury were permissible. 10 6
Additionally, Rosboro argued that FCC's claim was barred
since the Secretary indicated, in its commentary to the final redefi-
nition of "harm," that a claim for a "potential injury" to wildlife
would not be actionable. 10 7 The Rosboro court rejected this argu-
ment by distinguishing between "potential injury" and "imminent
threat" of injury. l08 Relying on the contrasting dictionary defini-
tions, the court reasoned that the terms are plainly distinct. 0 9 The
court, thus, concluded that a showing of an imminent threat to a
103. See id. at 784 (relying on 46 Fed. Reg. 54748-49 (1981)).
104. Id.
105. Id. The court determined that "actually kills or injures wildlife" was in-
serted into the redefinition of "harm" because the Secretary was concerned that
the old definition of "harm" could be construed to mean habitat modification
alone without any accompanying requirement of death or injury to protected wild-
life. Id. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 213, 54748-49 (1981)). According to the court, the
phrase was inserted to remedy such an improper interpretation. Id.
106. Id. The court examined in-depth, the "harm" redefinition, and its ex-
planatory commentary to decide that no historic injury to protected species is re-
quired. Id. "So long as some injury to wildlife occurs, either in the past, present,
or future the injury requirement of the Secretary's new definition would be satis-
fied. We conclude that a showing of an imminent threat of injury to wildlife suf-
fices." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 213, 54748, 54749 (1981)).
In the preamble to the definition of "harm," it was stated that " '[h]arm' covers
actions .. .which actually (as opposed to potentially), cause injury .... " 46 Fed.
Reg. 213, 54749 (1981) (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 44412, 44413 (September 26,
1975)). For further discussion of the preamble to the "harm" regulation, see infra
notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
108. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784-85. The court relied on the dictionary definitions
of "potential" and "imminent." " 'Potential' means 'existing in possibility.'" Id.
(quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY (2d ed. 1939)). " 'Imminent'
means 'ready to take place; near at hand.'" Id. at 785 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DIcriONARY (2d ed. 1939)).
109. Id. at 785. According to the court, "potential injury" denotes only injury
that may or may not occur. Id. In contrast, FCC claims that Rosboro's timber
activity creates an "imminent threat" of death or injury to the Northern Spotted
Owls (i.e., about to occur). Id.
22
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protected species is sufficient to maintain a citizen suit under
ESA.11 0
B. Statutory Purpose
The Ninth Circuit next considered the underlying purpose of
ESA to resolve any ambiguity surrounding the term "harm.""1 The
court noted that ESA was enacted to: protect endangered and
threatened species; prevent their further decline; and authorize cit-
izen suits seeking an injunction against an imminent threat of harm
to such species. 11 2 The court determined that foreclosing citizen
suits claiming an imminent threat of harm to protected species "is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the statute's purpose - to con-
serve endangered species."113
The Ninth Circuit bolstered its rationalization by referring to
propositions established by the Supreme Court regarding the pur-
pose of ESA. 114 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Court em-
phasized that in adopting ESA, Congress intended to protect
threatened species at any cost.1 1 5 In light of this proposition, the
110. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784. The Ninth Circuit noted that other courts have
held that the Secretary "juxtaposed the terms 'actually' and 'potentially' to specify
the degree of certainty that harm would befall a protected species, as opposed to
the timing of the injury." Id. at 785. For a discussion of other courts that have
addressed the Secretary's use of the terms "potentially" and "actually," see infra
note 130.
111. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785. The court reasoned that when Congress has not
clarified an issue, the court must " 'find that interpretation which can most fairly
be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with
its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested.'" Id. (quot-
ing United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted)).
112. Id. The court pointed to the events prior to the enactment of ESA and
various ESA provisions. Id. at 783, 785. ESA was enacted in 1973 "in response to
growing public concern about extinctions of various species of fish, wildlife, and
plants caused by economic growth and development untempered by adequate con-
cern and conservation." Id. at 783 (citing ESA § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)). The
court then referred to the two stated purposes of ESA: "(1) 'to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved' and (2) 'to provide a program for the conservation of
such . . . species.'" Id. at 785 (quoting ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). For a
further discussion of the purposes in enacting ESA, relevant statutory provisions
and legislative history, see supra notes 2, 9-23 and accompanying text.
113. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785.
114. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of ESA, see supra
notes 44-51 and accompanying text (discussing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978)).
115. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785 (" '[T]he plain intent of Congress in enacting
[ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost.' " (quoting Hill 437 U.S. at 184)). For the facts surrounding Hill and further
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Rosboro court remarked about the difficulty in preserving an endan-
gered species once a member of that species has been injured.11 6
C. Statutory Structure
The Ninth Circuit then examined the overall structure of ESA.
The court concluded that the Congressional inclusion of the citizen
suit provision, and the Attorney General's enforcement provision in
ESA permitted claims of an imminent threat of injury to wildlife to
be actionable.1 17
The court recognized that ESA's citizen suit provision contains
no requirement that claims be based on past injury to wildlife.
Therefore, the court held that the provision, by its very nature, is
directed at future actions.11 8 By focusing on the legislative history
of the citizen suit provision, the court supported its declaration that
"Congress anticipated citizen suits to enjoin prospective injuries."' 1 9
Analyzing the Attorney General's enforcement provision in
conjunction with the citizen suit provision,120 the court noted that
both provisions authorize suits " 'to enjoin any person who is al-
leged to be in violation of [ESA].' "121 The Ninth Circuit relied on
the legislative history of the Attorney General's enforcement provi-
sion to explain that Congress authorized injunctive relief to prevent
prospective harm.1 22 Noting that Congress modeled the Attorney
discussion of the prominent Supreme Court opinion, see supra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text.
116. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785. "[T]he Supreme Court noted [that]
'[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by
money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irrepara-
ble.' " Id. (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987)). Thus, the
Ninth Circuit accepted FCC's argument that forcing FCC to wait until after harm
had been inflicted would "render their claims moot before they became ripe." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. "'[C]itizen actions ... allow any person . . . to seek remedies
involving injunctive relief for violations or potential violations' (emphasis added)."
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973), repinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 979).
120. Id. " '[L] anguage used in one portion of a statute ... should be deemed
to have the same meaning as the same language used elsewhere in the statute.'"
Id. (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2070 (1993)).
121. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785; see supra note 40 (providing statutory language to
citizen suit provision); see supra note 38 (providing statutory language to Attorney
General's enforcement provision).
122. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786. The court referred to a prior Senate report to
emphasize Congress' explanation:
Injunctions provide greater opportunity to attempt resolution of
conflicts before harm to a species occurs .... The ability to enjoin a viola-
tion of the Act rather than the ability only to prosecute a completed viola-
24
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General's enforcement provision after the citizen suit provision, the
court inferred that Congress implicitly intended citizens to enjoin a
"potential violator" "before harm to a species occurs."' 23
D. Case Law
In determining that a showing of future injury to an endan-
gered or threatened species is actionable under ESA, the court ad-
dressed a prior Ninth Circuit opinion, Palila v. Hawaii Department of
Land & Natural Resources.124 In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed its prior Palila holding that " 'habitat destruction that
could result in extinction' constitutes a 'taking' in violation of
[ESA]."125 In Palila, the court upheld an injunction against pro-
spective harm, and rejected the State's assertion that ESA prohibits
only activities which effectuate the immediate destruction of the
Palila's food sources. 126
The Ninth Circuit then recognized that other case law sup-
ported interpreting ESA as authorizing injunctions against future
injury to a protected species. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the
Supreme Court prohibited the future operation of a dam that
threatened to destroy the critical habitat of the endangered snail
tion will better serve the interest of the public, the potential violator and
the potentially harmed species.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1411) (alteration in original).
123. Id. Finally, the court focused on an exception to the citizen suit provi-
sion to once more demonstrate that Congress intended to halt imminent threats of
injury to protected species. Id. Although the citizen suit provision requires plain-
tiffs to give defendants 60 days notice before filing suit, ESA § I I(g) (2) (C), 16
U.S.C. § 15 4 0 (g) (2) (C), provides an exception for actions that " 'pos[e] a signifi-
cant risk to the well-being of any [protected species].'" Id. (quoting ESA
§ 11 (g) (2) (C), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2) (C)); see supra note 40 for the relevant statu-
tory language of the citizen suit exception. Since petitioners may seek relief imme-
diately after notifying the Secretary, the court concluded that this exception
illustrates Congress' intent to enjoin imminent threats of injury to protected spe-
cies. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786.
124. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Palila, see supra notes 56-60
and accompanying text.
125. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786 (quoting Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natu-
ral Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1988)). In Palila, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's ruling that required the State to remove mouflon sheep
that ate the mamane-naio trees upon which Palila birds depend. Id. Evidence had
indicated that mouflon sheep can kill the mamane trees before new trees mature,
which could drive the Palila to extinction. Id. The Rosboro court rejected the de-
fendant's assertion that the Palila decision was based on the fact that mouflon
sheep had already eaten some of the mamane trees. Id.
126. Id.
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darter. 127 The Ninth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court did
not require plaintiffs to show a past injury to the snail darter, but
evidence of future injury was a sufficient basis for the injunction. 128
The Rosboro court next adopted the assertion made by the First Cir-
cuit in American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti,129 that courts have only en-
joined activity that actually harmed, or will actually harm, a
protected species. 130  The Ninth Circuit completed its discussion
of whether ESA precludes claims of future injury by analyzing the
three cases upon which Rosboro relied.131 The court rejected the
cases since none of the cases offered by Rosboro addressed the is-
sue of whether the imminent threat of harm to a protected species
was actionable under ESA.132
127. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 787 (citing Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978)). For a discussion of the facts of Hill, see supra notes 44 &
48. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that in reaching its decision, the Supreme
Court, rather than balancing the parties' interests, afforded the endangered spe-
cies the highest of priorities. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 787. Thus, even though TVA had
already expended billions of dollars on the dam project, the Court ordered a per-
manent injunction to terminate the dam's construction. Id.
128. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 787.
129. See supra note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of
American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993).
130. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 787. The Ninth Circuit noted that the American Bald
Eagle court clarified the Secretary's use of the terms "actually" and "potentially" in
the redefinition of harm. Id. According to American Bald Eagle, the terms were
used to specify the degree of certainty that injury would inflict a protected species,
as opposed to the timing of the injury. Id. (citing American Bald Eagle, 9 F.3d at
166). For a further discussion of the Secretary's use of the terms "actually" and
"potentially," see supra text accompanying note 110.
131. Rosboro cited and relied upon Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v.
Brown, 25 F.3d 1443 (9th Cir. 1994); and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United
States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990). Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786-87.
For further discussion of Rosboro's reliance on these cases, see infra note 132 and
accompanying text. See also supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing
Gwaltney); see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing Pyramid
Lake).
132. The court declared that Rosboro's reliance on Gwaltney, Pacific Northwest,
and Pyramid Lake was misguided. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786-87.
In Gwaltney, the defendants ceased violating the permit provision of the Clean
Water Act prior to the commencement of plaintiff's lawsuit. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at
786 (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53-54). In contrast to the question before the
Rosboro court, the issue in Gwaltney was "whether a citizen suit could be maintained
for unlawful conduct that occurred entirely in the past." Id. According to the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court "did not address whether citizen suits can be main-
tained for claims of only future violations, and in no way implied that such clams
are not actionable." Id. at 787.
In Pacific Northwest, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that
the "taking" of a listed species of salmon should not be labeled as merely "inciden-
tal." Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 787 (citing Pacific Northwest, 25 F.3d at 1452). Rosboro
pointed out that in Pacific Northwest the court "explained that Congress could not
have intended to prohibit all salmon fishing just because a listed species of salmon
26
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Completing its analysis of ESA's statutory language, purpose,
structure, and case law, the Rosboro court concluded that FCC's suit
to enjoin Rosboro's timber harvest was actionable under ESA. 133
Further discussion of these topics is necessary to determine whether
it was proper for the Ninth Circuit to hold that future injury to a
protected species is actionable under ESA.
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Rosboro, the Ninth Circuit was called upon to determine
whether ESA permits citizen suits that allege only a future injury to
a protected species. Ultimately, the court held that a showing of
future injury to a protected species is permissible under ESA.13 4 In
analyzing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in conjunction with ESA and
applicable case law, it is evident that segments of the court's deci-
sion were sound. However, in light of this analysis, much of the
court's reasoning remains questionable.
A. Statutory Language
The Supreme Court has indicated that an examination of rele-
vant statutory language is an appropriate starting point for a court's
analysis.13 5 The Rosboro court started with the plain language of the
"take" provision of ESA; then, referred to legislative history, and
determined that "take" is to be construed broadly.136 The court
quoted the Senate Report statement that "take" is " 'defined ... in
the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in
which a person can 'take' ... any fish or wildlife.' "137 Such use of
the circular statement that "take means take" is ineffective in resolv-
cannot be distinguished by sight from an unlisted species." Id. The Rosboro court
concluded that Pacific Northwest did not address the issue at hand (whether the
imminent threat of harm to a protected species was actionable under ESA). Id.
In Pyramid Lake, the Ninth Circuit did not enjoin the Navy's outlease program
which diverted water from the protected cui-ui fish because the facts did not prove
the Navy's program was the cause of the fish's spawning problem. Rosboro, 50 F.3d
at 787 (citing Pyramid Lake, 898 F.2d at 1410). The Rosboro court maintained that
the defect of the plaintiff's claim lay in the lack of a causal connection between the
action and the injury, not in the timing of the injury, and thus rejected the case.
Id.
133. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 788.
134. Id. at 783.
135. See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 415 (1990) ("As in all
cases of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the statute it-
self.");Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) ("We look first to the
face of the statute.").
136. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784.
137. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.CA.N. 2989, 2995).
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ing what is meant by a wildlife "taking." The court illogically used
the Senate Report to conclude that a threat of "harm" falls within
the definition of "take."138 Not only does the Senate Report not
apply to "harm," but it is more appropriate to construe "harm"
narrowly. ' 39
In addressing the "harm" regulation, the Ninth Circuit col-
lapsed two distinct legal issues into one. Rather than resolving the
"harm" regulation separate from ESA citizen suit provision, the
court focused on a combination of the issues. 140 The merging of
the two issues rendered the determination of each unclear. As a
result, the court failed to precisely resolve either provision.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit developed internally inconsis-
tent standards for proving "harm." The opinion first asserted that
the "harm" regulation requires that "some injury to wildlife occurs,
either in the past, present, or future."1 41 However, the very next
sentence stated that "an imminent threat of injuy to wildlife suffices,"
which suggested that the threat or possibility of injury is sufficient.1 42
The court created an arguably third inconsistent standard in deter-
mining that actions which are "reasonably certain to injure the Swartz
138. Id. Rosboro stated, "It is clearly conceivable that one can inflict great
harm on a protected species by creating an imminent threat of harm to that spe-
cies. Such a threat therefore falls easily within the broad scope of Congress' defini-
tion of 'take.' " Id. After making this conclusory statement, the court proceeded
to a separate issue and never provided support for its conclusion or rationalization
as to why it applied to "harm."
139. "Harm" was not included in the Committee Report definitions of "take."
See S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989, 2995. Therefore, the Committee Report statements on broadly interpreting
"take" do not apply to "harm." " 'Harm' was added on the Senate floor, as a part of
a group of 'technical and clarifying amendments,'" and its meaning was not de-
bated. Brief for Appellee at 17 n.10 (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 25,682-83 (July 24,
1973) (remarks of the amendments' sponsor, Sen. Tunney)); see North Haven Bd.
of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 527 (1982) (noting that sponsors' remarks "are the
only authoritative indications of congressional intent"). "'[I]t is inconceivable
that addition of a term characterized as a 'technical' insertion should be the basis
for an interpretation both significantly broader than the other statutory terms
. .. Brief for Appellee at 17 n.10 (quoting Palila Brief (CR 28, Def. Ex. F at 22
n.7, SER 29)).
140. Both the "harm" regulation (50 C.F.R. § 17.3) and ESA's citizen suit pro-
vision (ESA § I I(g) (1) (A), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A)) were at stake in Rosboro.
Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 782-83. The precise legal standard of "harm" needed to be
resolved, as well as, the distinct issue of whether ESA permits a citizen suit based
solely on claims of future violations. Id. Rather than addressing these two distinct
issues separately, the Ninth Circuit collapsed them, and focused on the issue of
future ESA violations. Id. at 783.
141. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784 (emphasis added) ("So long as some injury to
wildlife occurs, either in the past, present, or future, the injury requirement of the
Secretary's... definition would be satisfied.").
142. Id. (emphasis added).
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Creek owl pair... satisf[y] the 'actual injury' requirement." 143 The
court used phrases that are inherently contradictory, and never ar-
ticulated the precise standard to be applied. 144
Finally, the "harm" standard issued by the court was inconsis-
tent with the FWS's "harm" regulation, and the preamble to the
"harm" regulation. 145 The "harm" regulation states that an activity
is an unlawful ESA "taking" of wildlife only if it "actually kills or
injures wildlife."" 46 Since the "harm" regulation emphasizes this
language, it logically follows that even a high possibility of future
injury is not "harm.' 47 In deviating from the requirement of "ac-
tual harm" contained in the regulation, the Ninth Circuit decision
did not provide substantial support for its departure from strict stat-
utory interpretation of the regulation. 14s
The preamble, supplementary information issued by the FWS
in accordance with the final "harm" regulation, provides additional
support that an actual injury is required, rather than a mere show-
ing of future injury.1 49 However, the court never addressed this
persuasive piece of legislative history. The regulation's preamble
clearly indicates that a case must be dismissed where there is no
definite injury to, or death of, protected wildlife. 150
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. For example, the court concluded that "a showing of an imminent
threat of injury to wildlife suffices," however, the court never articulated what con-
stitutes "imminent." Id. at 784.
145. The FWS promulgated regulations that define the term "harm." See 50
C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). For further discussion of the FWS's "harm" regulation, see
supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the preamble to the
"harm" regulation, see infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
146. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (emphasis added); see supra note 32 for complete statu-
tory language. The "harm" regulation emphasizes the "actually kill or injure" re-
quirement twice in its language. See id. The Supreme Court has recently upheld
the "harm" regulation. See Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
147. See 50 C.F.R1 § 17.3. ESA itself only prohibits the "taking" of endangered
species, not the possibility of a "taking." See ESA §9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a) (1) (B).
148. See Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784. The Supreme Court has further addressed
ESA and the Secretary's "harm" provision in an opinion issued after Rosboro. See
Babbit, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). Justice O'Connor, concurring, indicates that "the
regulation is limited by its terms to actions that actually kill or injure individual
animals." Id. at 2418 (emphasis added). The regulation "is limited to significant
habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative,
death or injury to identifiable protected animals." Id.
149. See 46 Fed. Reg. 213, 54748-50 (1981) (final "harm" regulation).
150. The final rule states:
The purpose of the redefinition was to preclude claims of a Section 9
taking ... without any attendant death or injuy of the protected wild-
life.... [T]he word "actually" [has] be[en] reinserted in the defini-
tion to bulwark the need for proven injuiy to a species due to a party's
1996]
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B. Statutory Purpose
The Ninth Circuit properly turned to the underlying purpose
of ESA to resolve any ambiguity in the statutory language.151 How-
ever, the court's use of the purpose of ESA is problematic. ESA
statement, which notes that the purpose of the Act is to conserve
listed species and the ecosystems they inhabit, is cited by the court
to support a broad construction of "harm." 52 The court ignored
the next subsection of ESA which places the duty to conserve only
on federal agencies. 153 As previously stated by the government, reli-
ance on ESA's broad statement of purpose cannot overcome the
specific limitations Congress articulated in ESA's "taking" provi-
sions. 154 ESA's non-binding purpose of protecting ecosystems does
actions.... [T]he final redefinition... [is] precluding a taking where no
actual injury is shown.... [T] he Service feels that the legislative his-
tory cannot be read to prohibit habitat modification under section 9
without actual injury.... [T]he Service agrees with the many other
comments which recognized the need for actual injury.... The final
definition adds the word "actually" before the words "kills or injures"
to clarify that a standard of actual, adverse effects applies to section 9
takings.... To be subject to section 9, the modification or degrada-
tion must be significant, must significantly impair essential behavioral
patterns, and must result in actual injury to a protected wildlife
species.
46 Fed. Reg. 213, 54748-50 (1981) (emphasis added).
151. The Rosboro court noted that "[w]hen Congress has not addressed an
issue, we must 'find that interpretation which can most fairly said to be imbedded
in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the
general purposes that Congress manifested.' " Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785 (quoting
United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991)) (citations
omitted).
152. See Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785 (citing ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). For
a further discussion of the stated purposes of ESA and relevant statutory language,
see supra notes 2, 16-17 & 21-23 and accompanying text.
153. See ESA § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c); see supra note 23 (providing lan-
guage of § 2 (c), § 1531 (c)). ESA statutory provisions provide an explanation: ESA
§ 5 (Interagency Cooperation) (16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1)) creates a federal duty to
carry out "conservation" programs, but ESA § 9 (Prohibited Acts) (16 U.S.C.
§ 1538) does not use either "conservation" or "habitat protection" language in
describing duties of nonfederal parties because the duty to conserve is on federal
agencies.
154. As the United States set forth in its amicus brief to the Ninth Circuit in
Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, "[r]eliance on this broad state-
ment of purpose [in § 2 (b), § 1531(b)] cannot, however, overcome the limitations
of the specific language Congress has chosen in Section 9 of the Act." Brief for
Appellee at 16 (citing National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 696 F.2d 156, 177-78
(D.C. Cir. 1982)). "The responsibility to conserve, as defined in the Act, is specifi-
cally directed at federal agencies and activities [see ESA §§ 2(c), 7(a) (1), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531(c), 1536(a)(1)], and not to the other persons and entities that are subject
to [ESA § 9, 28 U.S.C. § 1538]." Id.; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct.
1483, 1508 (1994) ("Statutes are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and com-
promises necessary to their enactment may require adopting means other than
those than would most effectively pursue the main goal."); Rodriguez v. United
30
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not supersede the specific limitations Congress intended on ESA
"taking" concepts.
While the Rosboro court's reliance on the underlying purpose
of ESA is misplaced, there was some validity to the court's reference
to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.155 In Hill, the Supreme Court
affirmed a broad, expansive reading of ESA. 156 The Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of ESA provided some support for the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the statute should be read broadly
to allow citizen suits to enjoin an imminent threat of harm to pro-
tected wildlife.
C. Statutory Structure
The Rosboro court next attempted to justify its conclusion by
simultaneously focusing on the citizen suit provision and the Attor-
ney General's enforcement provision. This approach is inappropri-
ate. First, rather than adhering to the plain statutory language of
the citizen suit provision, the court argued that the legislative his-
tory of a later-enacted ESA provision on federal (not citizen) suits for
injunctive relief should control over the plain meaning of the citi-
zen suit provision. 157 The statutory language of the citizen suit pro-
vision is precise and unambiguous. The provision allows any
person to bring a citizen suit against any other person "who is al-
leged to be in violation of [ESA] .'"58 This phrase plainly requires a
current violation.1 59 Bypassing the plain meaning of the statute in
favor of committee report statements of a separate ESA provision is
contrary to precedent. 60
States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) ("[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative
intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective
must be law.").
155. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). For further discussion of the facts and holding of
Hill see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
156. The Supreme Court concluded that "[tihe plain intent of Congress in
enacting [ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost." Hill 437 U.S. at 184. For a discussion of the holding in Hil
see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 41 (providing statutory language to ESA's citizen suit pro-
vision); see supra note 38 (discussing Attorney General's enforcement position).
158. ESA § 11 (g) (1) (A), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1) (A).
159. Since the 'alleged to be in violation' phrase plainly requires a current
violation and since it has been so interpreted by many courts, this meaning simply
cannot be undone by legislative history that was not voted upon. Congress can
create law "only through the passage of a bill which is approved by both Houses
and signed by the President," and did so only through the ESA's § 11(e) (6) and
(g) language. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989).
160. Where there is "a phrase that is unambiguous - that has a clearly ac-
cepted meaning in both legislative and judicial practice -we do not permit it to be
1996]
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Furthermore, many citizen suit provisions use language identi-
cal to ESA's citizen suit provision. 161 Other courts, including the
Supreme Court in Gwaltrwy of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foun-
dation, have interpreted the "alleged to be in violation" clause of the
citizen suit provision to require a current violation. 162 The Ninth
Circuit should have followed the guidance of the Supreme Court
and Congressional intent, rather than creating confusion by inter-
preting the citizen suit language in a new manner.1 63
Finally, the court stated that it has "no problem inferring Con-
gress' implicit intent' to authorize citizen suits that only allege a fu-
ture injury to a protected species. 164 By stating that it is merely
"inferring" its conclusion, the court not only seemed to recognize
that it does not have a solid basis to justify its result, but exceeded
the scope of established Supreme Court declarations. 65 It seems
improbable that a future court will be willing to rely on the Ninth
Circuit's "inference" of implicit intent.
D. Case Law
The Ninth Circuit completed its analysis by addressing prior
judicial decisions. Difficulty arises when criticizing the Ninth Cir-
cuit's analysis since inconsistencies in the existing case law created a
challenging task.166 In light of prior judicial opinions, portions of
expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or committees
during the course of the enactment process." West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991).
161. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting identical language be-
tween citizen suit provision of ESA and citizen suit provision of Clean Water Act).
162. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,
59 (1987) (holding that language of citizen suit provision requires plaintiffs to
allege continuous violation). For further discussion of the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the language of the citizen suit provision, see supra notes 75-78 and
accompanying text. See also Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 853 F.2d 667, 669
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that language of citizen suit provision only allows suits to
abate ongoing violation).
163. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the citizen suit
provision, see supra note 173 and accompanying text & infra notes 185-86. For a
discussion of Congressional intent regarding the citizen suit provision, see supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
164. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786 (emphasis added).
165. E.g., Oregon Revenue Dep't v. ACF Indus., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 843, 850-51
(1994) ("'We do not, absent unambiguous evidence, infer ... beyond that which
clearly is mandated by Congress' language.'" (quoting Cippolone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S, 2608, 2614 (1992)); id. at 850 ("When determining the
breadth of a federal statute .. .we are hesitant to extend the statute beyond its
evident scope.").
166. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has been inconsistent with its own hold-
ings. Compare Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106,
1110 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that activity that could result in extinction constitutes
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the court's analysis are justified, while other portions appear
questionable.
The court's opinion relied on Palila v. Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources, a prior Ninth Circuit decision. 167 The
Palila court's holding supported the Rosboro court's conclusion that
FCC was authorized to enjoin a future threat of injury to the North-
ern Spotted Owl. 1 68 However, rather than confront another Ninth
Circuit opinion that appears to conflict with Palila, the court dis-
missed it. The court claimed that Rosboro's reliance on the Pyra-
mid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Department of Navy
opinion was misplaced.169 In Pyramid Lake, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected an ESA "taking" claim where the action did not "actually
cause" injury to the protected species.1 70 Thus, the Pyramid Lake
holding, which required actual injury, is contrary to the Rosboro
holding which authorized future injury to protected wildlife. 171
The court next rejected Rosboro's reliance on Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, distinguishing the
Supreme Court opinion as involving the issue of citizen suits against
past violations. 172 While that was the fact pattern in Gwaltney, the
Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that the Supreme Court reached a
broader reading of the statutory language contained in the citizen
suit provision of ESA. 173 The Supreme Court articulated that the
statutory language requires "plaintiffs [to] allege a state of either
"harm," and thus ESA "taking") and National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R-,
23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that mere likelihood offuture injury is suffi-
cient to obtain injunction) with Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United
States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring actual injury to
wildlife to constitute ESA "taking").
167. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Palila, see supra notes 56-60
and accompanying text.
168. On the facts of Rosboro it can be argued that Rosboro's activity that could
result in destruction of the owls amounts to a "taking." For a discussion of the facts
of Rosboro, see supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
169. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 787. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Pyra-
mid Lake. see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
170. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of Navy, 898
F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990).
171. See id. (requiring actual injury to constitute "taking"); cf. Rosboro, 50 F.3d
at 783 (permitting future injury to constitute "taking").
172. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 787.
173. Gwaltney addressed the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act.
However, its language is identical to the language of ESA's citizen suit provision.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987). Compare supra note 77 (reciting language of citi-
zen suit provision of Clean Water Act) with supra note 40 (reciting language of
citizen suit provision of ESA).
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continuous or intermittent violation - that is, a reasonable likeli-
hood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future." 174
Prior cases have interpreted the language contained in the citi-
zen suit provision to exclude claims that allege only a future viola-
tion. The Ninth Circuit, itself, has repeatedly held that the
identical "alleged to be in violation" language contained in the citi-
zen suit provision does not permit a suit over a future violation.1 75
Based on these prior interpretations, FCC's allegation of a specula-
tive one-time future violation of ESA, which will not result in the
extinction of a species, is insufficient to establish an actionable "tak-
ing."1 76 The court did not completely review the language of the
citizen suit provision in light of these prior courts' holdings.
Relying heavily on Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill the Ninth
Circuit asserted that the Supreme Court found future harm action-
able.1 77 While the Supreme Court issued an injunction to halt the
construction of a dam in favor of protecting an endangered species,
the Supreme Court did not address whether future harm is actiona-
174. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57. The Supreme Court noted that the statutory
language of the citizen suit provision only authorizes injunctive relief actions
against persons who are alleged to have violated the Act as of the day of suit. See id.
at 54-55; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
reading of citizen suit statutory language).
Based on Gwaltney's reading of the citizen suit language, attorneys for Rosboro
noted that the citizen suit provision of ESA simply prevents a premature citizen
suit before any ESA violation has occurred. Brief for Appellee at 27. Thus, they
argued that claims of ongoing ESA takings are permissible under Gwaltney. Id. at
27-28. Rosboro attorneys noted that FCC cited Palila as a case concerning a wholly
future "taking." Id. at 27. However, according to the attorneys, Palila involves both
past and future "takings" of wildlife, and is, therefore, permitted under Gwaltney.
Id.; see also Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (ongoing federal
timber activities constituted ESA taking of endangered red-cockaded wood-
pecker); United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.
Cal. 1992) (continuing pumping activity of irrigation district constituted taking of
threatened winter-run salmon).
175. See League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1173
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979) (plaintiff attempts to predicate "federal
jurisdiction based solely upon allegations of a prospective violation of the ambient
air quality standards. [The] Act provides no basis for such a suit") (emphasis ad-
ded); Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Assoc., 501 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1034 (1974) (concluding that since "no applicable standards or orders
have been issued, this action will not lie" where the law only authorizes suit against
a person "alleged to be in violation of... an order" (quoting citizen suit provision of
Clean Air Act) (emphasis added));see also cases cited supra note 79.
176. See Brief for Appellee at 24. FCC's Amended Complaint and Brief in the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon did not allege that Rosboro
was in present violation of the ESA. Id. at n.16. Rather, FCC argued that Ros-
boro's proposed timber harvesting would cause a future ESA "taking" of a pro-
tected owl. Id.
177. See Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 787. For a discussion of the facts and holding of
Hill, see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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ble under ESA. 17s The Rosboro court also interpreted Hill to imply
that protected species will always win. 179 Although the purpose of
ESA is to conserve endangered species, the Ninth Circuit's reading
"expect[s] more from the [Hill] case than its facts and holding will
allow."180
The Ninth Circuit claimed that other circuits have recognized
that ESA authorizes injunctions against a future injury to a pro-
tected species. The Rosboro court cited the First Circuit's American
Bald Eagle v. Bhatti opinion to support its position that future injury
is actionable; however, that case suggests the contrary.18 1 The First
Circuit held that even a "significant risk" of future injury is not
"harm" and does not allow an activity which merely holds the possi-
bility of future injury to be enjoined. 8 2 Instead, the court noted
that "for there to be harm under ESA, there must be actual injury to
178. The existence of ESA violations "was stipulated" in Hill and the Supreme
Court was only reviewing whether, in the face of admitted ESA violations, it should
issue an injunction. See Hill 437 U.S. at 156, 171-72. The Supreme Court merely
cited ESA's takings provisions and the "harm" language to bolster its conclusion
that ESA requires an injunction when there is found to be an ESA violation. See id.
at 184-85.
179. Rosboro asserted that in Hil4 "the Supreme Court concluded that '[tihe
plain intent of Congress in enacting [ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend to-
ward species extinction, whatever the cost.'" Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785 (quoting Hil
437 U.S. at 184) (emphasis added). Hill is often quoted for its assertion that "the
balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of
priorities." Hill, 437 U.S. at 194.
180. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. r.R, 23 F.3d 1508, 1512 (9th
Cir. 1994) (recognizing danger of reading Hill too broadly); see also Platte River
Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In Platte River, the Whooping Crane Criti-
cal Habitat Maintenance Trust ("Trust") requested that F.E.R.C. insert environ-
mental protective conditions into hydroelectric facilities' annual licenses. Id. at 30.
The facility operated upstream from the habitat of the endangered whooping
crane. Id. It was found that, absent protective measures, the project operations
could affect the species and result in irreversible environmental damage. Id. at 31.
Trust relied on Hill to argue that ESA obliges the F.E.R.C. to do "whatever it takes"
to protect the species in the Platte River area, regardless of the F.E.R.C.'s authority.
Id. at 34. The D.C. Circuit held that Trust's interpretation of Hill and ESA was "far-
fetched," thus denying Trust's request. Id.
181. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts
and holding of American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993).
182. American Bald Eagle, 9 F.3d at 165. The American Bald Eagle opinion itself
seems to be internally inconsistent. See id. at 165-66. Two of the court's state-
ments appear to suggest future harm is actionable. For example, the First Circuit
states that "courts have granted injunctive relief only where petitioners have shown
that the alleged activity has actually harmed the species or if continued will actu-
ally, as opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species." Id. at 166. However, the
court's overriding theme, virtually all of the court's statements, and the court's
actual holding state that "for there to be 'harm' under the ESA, there must be
actual injuy to the listed species." Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
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the listed species."' 8 3 Reliance on American Bald Eagle, therefore,
discredits rather than supports the Rosboro court's holding, since
the Rosboro decision permits future injury, whereas American Bald
Eagle rejects it.
Additional cases appear to conflict with the Rosboro court's re-
sult. While Rosboro authorized a claim of future injury, other cases
have dismissed similar claims that allege a future risk of "taking."1 84
Those cases refused to ban activities as ESA "takings" where only a
potential risk that the activity would "take" a protected species ex-
isted.185 Consideration of those prior opinions may have led the
court to refuse to find an enjoinable "taking," where there was only
some risk that Rosboro's timber harvesting would take the North-
ern Spotted Owl.
VI. IMPACT
Several recent crises between endangered species and eco-
nomic interests have focused attention on ESA. 186 In one of the
most publicized of these crises, the protection of the Northern
Spotted Owl has created immeasurable problems for the lumber
industry.'87 Rosboro exemplifies the crisis between ESA and eco-
183. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
184. See cases cited supra note 69 and accompanying text.
185. See Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 25 F.3d 1443, 1452
(9th Cir. 1994). In Pacific Northwest, the Ninth Circuit refused to ban all salmon
fishing as an ESA taking where there was only a probabilistic risk that any fish
harvesting operation would injure a listed salmon species. Id. "[lit cannot be be-
lieved that Congress intended to ban all salmon fishing in the Columbia and Snake
Rivers and in the Pacific Ocean whenever one salmon stock, indistinguishable by
sight, became endangered." Id.
186. Human and wildlife populations are coming into inexorably increasing
conflict. Abramson, supra note 4, at Al. Conservationists contend that the govern-
ment is failing to adequately protect endangered and threatened species, while
business interests are demanding "consideration of the economic impact of saving
creatures such as the spotted owl." Id. In the meantime, "thousands of timber
industry workers and dozens of timber dependent communities in the Northwest
remain hostage in the legal and political battles over the owl." On the Environment.
Consider Jobs and Owls, 105 LA. DAILYJ. 6 (May 28, 1992).
For further discussion of the debate between environmentalists and develop-
mentalists, see supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text; see also Berschauer, supra
note 1, at 1000-1006 (discussing clash in values between environment and
development).
187. "The timber industry is furious that the bird has gotten so much public
support and has been able to halt much of its logging activities on public lands."
Berschauer, supra note 1, at 1006; see id. at 1006 n.99 (citing Protection Sought for
Owl Living in Northwest, 18 ENvTL. REp. 1372 (1987) ("Northern Spotted Owl in
decline because its critical habitat, old-growth forests, have been reduced due to
logging on public lands")).
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nomic interests, and its holding is likely to have serious
ramifications.
As a practical matter, the ambiguous and inconsistent analysis
developed by the Ninth Circuit will be troublesome for other courts
to follow. 18 8  Rather than developing a model for subsequent
courts, the Ninth Circuit merely contributed to the confusion in
the existing law. Further, Rosboro seems to be an invitation for any-
one embracing a cause or holding a grudge to enjoin a land use
simply because such use imposes some risk of future injury to pro-
tected wildlife.1 89 It is possible that a multitude of "taking" cases
will now burden the courts as those interested in halting logging
and development adopt the owl as the basis for a lawsuit.190
More important is the precedent Rosboro sets for corporate and
economic interests. While environmentalists will hail the decision,
major developmental interests will look at the decision with exas-
peration.' 9 ' It is probable that species that developmentalists con-
188. "Clarification is needed to provide the district court with direction ...
and to provide direction to other courts on this recurring issue regarding the stan-
dard of proof for 'harm' to obtain a permanent injunction." Brief for Appellee at
6, Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir.
1995), petition for reh 'g and suggestion for reh 'g in banc (No. 94-35070).
189. As commentators have already noted: " 'Instead of being the protection
that it should be for endangered species, the [ESA] has become a tool for people
who want to stop some particular thing .... It was intended as a shield and not as a
sword.' " Abramson, supra note 4, at Al (quoting Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan,
Jr.).
190. See Who Cares About Owls?Jobs Are More Important, 103 LA. DAILYJ. 6 (May
9, 1990) [hereinafter Who Cares About Owls]. One commentator noted that envi-
ronmentalists have won many of their court room victories against loggers before
the Ninth Circuit by using the owl as a basis to bring suit. Id.
191. The view of industrialists and developmentalists is one that gives priority
to their own economic interests. Berschauer, supra note 1, at 1004. "They have to
[take this view]. Corporate law requires directors of a corporation to have only
one goal - increase corporate profits for the benefit of the shareholders." Id. (cit-
ing American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis & Rec-
ommendations § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984)). The economic view is
supported by religious scriptures. Id. For example, the Book of Genesis states:
Then God said, "And now we will make human beings... They will
have power over the fish, the birds, and all animals, domestic and wild,
large and small." So God created many human beings . . .He cre-
ated them ... and said, "Have many children, so that your descend-
ants will live all over the earth and bring it under their control. I am
putting you in charge of theffish, the birds, and all the wild animals...
Id. at 1004-05 (quoting Genesis 1:26-29 (alteration in original)).
The Book of Genesis expresses that God created the earth and all other forms
of life solely for the use of humans, and humans "should dominate and assert
power to control wildlife." Id. at 1005. Private landowners see no reason why they
should not be able to develop the earth. Id. On the other hand, others believe
that ESA values the survival of species above all other human values - economic,
social, or otherwise. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. ESA did not
allow for a balancing of economic interests against the interests of protected spe-
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sider insignificant will put a halt to large, industrial projects. 192
Strongly adverse economic consequences could result if protected
wildlife stops projects of local or regional significance. For the tim-
ber industry, in particular, the Rosboro decision could escalate the
price of wood, increase the costs of new construction, and put many
people out of work.193 While economists debate the precise eco-
nomic impact of Rosboro, the decision will likely cost the State of
Oregon millions of dollars in foregone economic development and
tax revenue. 1
94
Determining that economic growth and development was ac-
celerating the extinction of numerous species in America, Congress
enacted ESA to reduce the risk of extinction by eliminating the neg-
ative effects of development and growth.' 9 5 Given this mandate for
the protection of species, it is inevitable that conflicts over land will
cies. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("balance has
been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities").
192. Congress amended ESA to provide an exemption process for projects
regarded as overwhelmingly important. However, commentators note that the
process is complicated and has not been used. Berschauer, supra note 1, at 998 &
n.55. The Endangered Species Committee, known as the God Squad, will exempt
a project from the statutory ESA requirements only when:
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alter-
native courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its
critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance;
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption appli-
cant made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources
prohibited by subsection (d) of this section.
ESA §§ 7(h) (1) (A) (i)-(iv), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(h) (1) (A) (i)-(iv); see also Berschauer,
supra note 1, at 998 n.55 (discussing exemption process of God Squad).
An exemption must also include mitigation and species enhancement meas-
ures to minimize the adverse effects of the proposed project. See ESA
§ 7(h) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1) (B) (stating that reasonable mitigation in-
cludes, but is not limited to, live propagation, transplantation, and habitat acquisi-
tion and improvement). Because the exemption process is complicated and
unutilized, Berschauer notes that "it can hardly be said that Congress retreated
from its position under the [ESA]." Berschauer, supra note 1, at 998 n.55.
193. Berschauer, supra note 1, at 1006 (noting arguments made by members
of timber industry); see Sweet Home Chapter of Communities v. Lujan, 806 F.
Supp. 279, 282 (D.D.C. 1992) (Small landowners, logging companies and families
dependent on forest products industry claimed that FWS' restrictions to enforce
"harm" regulation "have forced them to lay off employees, limited their income
from trust lands, reduced the timber supply, and placed some of [them] in the
position of being unable to support their families.").
194. See Court to Hear Spotted Owl Controversy, 108 LA. DAILY J. 1 (April 17,
1995) (discussing economic consequences of expansive definition of "harm").
195. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990.
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arise between human progress and species protected under ESA.196
While the protection of species is vital, economic growth cannot be
halted as the nation moves into the 21st century.197 By allowing
action for future injury, Rosboro does not adequately recognize the
limits of the social and economic costs society can afford in saving a
species.
MaryJo Wlazlo
196. See Berschauer, supra note 1, at 994.
197. One commentator notes:
No question about it, they're cute. But is the spotted owl so cute that
thousands of families of men, women and children have to abandon their
jobs and homes on its behalf? That's a rhetorical question. Anyone who
follows American politics and the environmental movement knows that if
its a choice between people and animals today, the animals will probably
win.... People in... Oregon... stand to lose anywhere from 9,000 to
60,000 logging jobs, not to mention the thousands of other jobs serving
the timber industry (there isn't much else to do in these timber ar-
eas).... [T]he environmental lobby should [not] be accorded the moral
high ground on this one .... If this nation's land laws, its courts, its
federal agencies and Congress have arrived at the point that Americans
have to leave their jobs and homes on behalf of 3,000 owls, then the polit-
ical system is not functioning as intended.
Who Cares About Owls?, supra note 194, at 6.
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